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"If we knew more about the reasons why men and women differed in their psychopathology, then we would 
be well on the way to understanding the causes of many mental disorders." (Mayo, 1976, p. 26) Stoppard has 
attempted to shed light on the conundrum of sex differences in depression. Her point of departure is a brief 
review of the basic tenets of several cognitive and behavioural models of depression. She subsequently tallies 
up the number of studies showing male/female differences in measures that, according to each theoretical 
perspective, indicate vulnerability to depression. Stoppard's analysis clearly reinforces the need to consider sex 
differences in depression and underscores the inadequacy of a simplistic "deficit" or "vulnerability" model in 
explaining such a complex disorder as depression. She also reminds us of our need to consider the differential 
stressors that men and women experience and the implications they have for any formulation  of 
psychopathology.  Finally, Stoppard’s review sensitizes researchers and clinicians to implicit sexist biases that may 
inadvertently be conveyed in clinical theory and practice. For these efforts, Stoppard deserves kudos! 
While Stoppard's review perks the interest of researchers and clinicians in these issues, there are several 
problems inherent in her approach. These include: the failure to adequately consider general 
methodological issues that need to be addressed by researchers interested in investigating sex differences in 
psychopathology; and problems related to Stoppard's interpretation and evaluation of cognitive / behavioural 
models of depression. 
 Methodological Issues 
 Sample.  
  Stoppard fails to consider the heterogeneity of the depression disorder and she ignores epidemiological variations 
in depression across groups (e.g., studies showing limited sex differences in depression among the Amish 
[Egeland & Hosteter, 1983]). For the most part, the studies reviewed by Stoppard assess sex differences in college 
students. As Stoppard notes this is "a group in which sex differences on vulnerability factors typically are not 
found.'' Only two studies cited by Stoppard assessed sex differences in clinical populations. Clearly, we cannot 
begin to understand depression in women by reviewing research that is almost exclusively based on college 
students. The need to investigate vulnerability factors in clinical populations is particularly important when we 
consider that sex differences for depression are most apparent when we examine lifetime prevalence for 
depression rather than incidence or point prevalence (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1981; Eastwood & Kramer, 
1981; Weissman &  Myers, 1978).  This research suggests that sex differences in vulnerability to depression are 
most clearly noted with respect to the recurrence rather then the first episode of depression. Hence, research 
examining sex differences in vulnerability factors related to relapse may provide a better avenue for 
understanding the greater rate of depression in women than research examining sex differences in 
vulnerability factors in college students, many of whom have not yet experienced a depressive episode. 
Changes over the Life Span. 
Stoppard fails to con- sider the changing incidence of depression over the life span. The higher incidence of 
depression in women occurs most often in the younger age groups (20 to 44). The incidence of depression in 
women decreases with age and by 65 depression appears to occur equally often in both sexes (Nolen & Hoeksema, 
1987). What happens to Stoppard's social stress hypothesis at age 65? Are the differential stressors women 
experience less likely to occur after age 65? Initial attempts to address these questions have been offered by 
Kessler and McLeod (1984), Murphy (1986) and Solomon and Rothblum (1986). 
Measures  of  Vulnerability. 
Stoppard  equates  the respective cognitive/behavioural models with only one or two self-report measures that 
are often of limited reliability and validity. The measures reviewed often have questionable status as 
vulnerability markers of depression (Segal, 1988). The author fails to critically evaluate the literature that has 
questioned, and often challenged,  the  measures  that  are reviewed  (e.g., Sutton-Simon's [1981] critique of the 
Irrational Beliefs Scales; Dweck and Wortman's  [1982]  critique of attributional measures; Butler and 
Meichenbaum's [ 1981] critique of problem-solving measures). Given the often questionable validity of these 
measures we should not interpret the absence of sex differences on such questionnaires as a test of the respective 
theories.  
Evaluating  Vulnerability Models. 
Stoppard has also failed to recognize the methodological limitations that characterize much of the research 
investigating vulnerability  to depression.  For example,  Abramson, Alloy and Metalsky (1988) note that few 
depression vulnerability studies adequately test the diathesis/stress model of depression. These studies do not 
examine the interaction between relevant social stressors (negative life events) and attributions for that event. 
Perhaps it is not the mere exposure to social stressors but rather a special matching between particular 
vulnerability and social stressors that contribute to depression. For example, as suggested by Hammen and her 
colleagues (1988), unipolar (but not bipolar) depressives who are overly concerned about social acceptance 
(sociotropic) are more likely to become depressed when experiencing negative interpersonal events that imply 
rejection and abandonment. Although Stoppard notes the importance of a diathesis/stress notion in depression 
research, she fails to take this into consideration as a criterion in selecting studies for her review. Since the 
majority of studies reviewed by Stoppard do not assess the diathesis/stress notion, this research is of limited 
value in providing a clear assessment of sex differences in vulnerability to depression. We need to realize 
that the research to date is marked by numerous flaws and generally does not provide an adequate test of 
vulnerability factors in depression onset or maintenance. Any review of vulnerability markers for depression 
that is based on the existing literature, regardless of the target concern, will suffer from the same inadequacies. 
Cognitive/Behavioural Models of Depression: Theoretical  Issues 
Stoppard portrays the cognitive/behavioural models as having a stagnant simplistic view of psychopathology - that 
a specific deficit causes depression. We believe this is a misreading of many of the theorists. Moreover, Stoppard's 
presentation does not reflect the more recent attempts by cognitive/behavioural advocates to be sensitive to the 
transactional, reciprocally deterministic, nature of behaviour (e.g., see Bandura, 1985; Hollon 
& Kriss, 1984; Mahoney, 1985; Meichenbaum & Gilmore, 1984; Turk & Salovey, 1985). A number of these 
cognitive/behavioural theorists have highlighted the highly complex interdependent ways that cognition 
(cognitive events, processes, structures), emotion, interpersonal behaviour, and their resultant 
consequences, social conditions, and physiological processes, interact. Cognition and behaviour are viewed 
as only two of several components in understanding psychopathology. Furthermore, the causal role of 
cognition is viewed as complex and bidirectional rather than unidirectional. Attempts to identify a specific 
deficit or diathesis as underlying depression will likely prove as inadequate as similar attempts by researchers to 
find specific deficits for other forms of psychopathology. Researchers might find greater value in viewing 
disorders as a function of a configuration of several processes that influence different aspects of functioning. 
We do concur with Stoppard that models that suggest or even imply that an individual's depression is due to 
a specific deficit (e.g., cognitive distortions, inadequate problem-solving skills) have the potential of being 
pernicious. For instance, if a therapist focuses exclusively on one type of deficit in depression (e.g., negative 
interpretations of events; negative eviiluation of the self) at the exclusion of other deficits that may be present 
(e.g., inadequate interpersonal skills; low social support), this may increase the probability of relapse for the 
client. Moreover, a patient may mis- takenly interpret a failure to maintain therapeutic gains as an indication of 
further inadequacy ("If I could only think right, behave right, then I wouldn't be depressed). 
 Are  Cognitive/Behavioural   Theories  ''Male-Biased''? 
    We do not concur with Stoppard's conclusion that "cognitive theories are male-biased in their assump-tions 
about the features that increase the vulnerability to depression."  From our perspective, cognitive/behavioural 
theories are neither ''male-biased'' nor "female-biased."  Cognitive/behavioural approaches attempt to work 
collaboratively with clients to understand, articulate and evaluate treatment goals, and then to help clients achieve 
those goals. Quite often, individuals face very real stressors and societal obstacles that get in their way of 
achieving their goals. Often these events lead to dysfunctional beliefs and feelings about the self in relation 
to the world - individuals feel incapacitated and unable to cope effectively with stressors. The goal of 
cognitive therapy is to help patients to identify stressors and their reactions to stress that are maladaptive. 
Therapy is designed to empower clients -to help them to regain control and a feeling of efficacy in coping 
with problems in their lives.  In this way a cognitive/behavioural approach is committed to humanistic 
objectives that reflect great respect for people's circumstances and their values and goals. 
Out of this perspective emerges both research and theory that is well in line with the humanizing and equalizing 
objectives of the feminist movement. 
While we strongly believe that the perspective that is adopted by cognitive/behavioural theorist is neither male-
biased nor female-biased, we also believe that theorists and clinicians interested in understanding and treating 
disorders that are more likely to occur in a particular segment of the population need to consider the unique 
social conditions of that group. Any discussion of sex differences in psychopathology should begin with a 
recognition of the relatively powerless position of women that results from the legal, social, and economic 
discrimination they face. As the U.S. President's Commission on Mental  Health (1978, 
p. 17) concluded:  "The poverty, dependency, and powerlessness associated with women's roles and the 
devaluation of women's status have destructive effects on women's mental health." Weissman and Klerman (1977, 
p. 106) drew a similar conclusion: "Sex discrimination results in legal and economic helplessness, dependency on
others, chronically low self-esteem, low aspirations, and ultimately, clinical depression. A combination of 
economic discrimination (women earn approximately 60% of men's salaries for the same work) and social 
expectations (for women to be submissive,  dependent,  and  passive)  contributes  to feelings of helplessness 
and can foster vulnerabilty to mental disorders such as depression. We believe the existence of these social 
stressors does not preclude the value  of  cognitive/behavioural   therapies  for treating depressed women. In 
fact, because cognitive/behavioural therapies offer individuals the opportunity to examine the impact of such 
stressors on their view of themselves and on their beliefs about their self-efficacy, it may be particularly well-suited for 
the treatment of women suffering from depress
